| Threat | Example | Receipts today | Your control |
| Spoofing | Someone presents a receipt signed with a different key | Detected when the verifier's key fingerprint is compared with the published one | [FILL IN: who compares, over which channel] |
| Tampering | A step, amount or time is changed after signing | Detected: the signed hash tree no longer matches | [FILL IN] |
| Tampering (before signing) | The log is altered before it is signed, or the agent records something false | Not detected; a receipt covers what was recorded | [FILL IN: access control on the log, human review] |
| Repudiation | An operator later denies a step happened | The signed receipt and its RFC 3161 time stamp show the step was recorded at that time | [FILL IN] |
| Information disclosure | A receipt reveals personal or secret data to its recipients | Values can be stored as hashes; single steps can be hidden while the root still verifies | [FILL IN: which fields are hashed, salting] |
| Denial of service | The verifier cannot fetch the public key | Offline check with OpenSSL against a saved PEM works without destill.ai | [FILL IN: where you keep the PEM] |
| Elevation of privilege | The signing key is stolen | Not prevented: no hardware custody, rotation or revocation yet (roadmap) | [FILL IN: interim plan, contact for incidents] |